Book review: hate speech and democratic citizenship by Eric Heinze by Reid, Andrew
2017-3-23




In Hate Speech and Democratic Citizenship, Eric Heinze argues for the unrestricted right to freedom of
speech in contemporary democratic states, positioning it as one of the ‘legitimising expressive conditions’ of
democratic citizenship. While some readers may take issue with Heinze’s particular conceptualisation of democracy
and his account of the potential risks of hate speech, this is an important and accessible discussion of freedom of
expression that gives credence to the real-world factors that shape legal regimes, writes Andrew Reid. 
Hate Speech and Democratic Citizenship. Eric Heinze. Oxford University Press. 2016.
Find this book: 
Debates about the regulation of speech are never far from
the opinion pages, although even passionate defences of
freedom of expression often go little further than platitudes
and aphorisms. In this book, Hate Speech and Democratic
Citizenship, legal philosopher Eric Heinze sets out a
systematic case for an unimpeded right to freedom of
expression in contemporary democratic states. In
particular, he provides a sustained critique of ‘viewpoint-
selective’ bans on acts of expression often referred to as
‘hate speech’. He argues that we ought to think of freedom
of expression not as an exhaustive natural right, but as
something ‘constitutive’ of democratic citizenship.
Freedom of expression is, for Heinze, one of the
‘legitimising expressive conditions’ of democracy (95). Any
restriction on acts of expression undermines the
democratic credentials of the state and damages (but does
not completely undermine) its legitimacy (86-87). It is
important that Heinze claims that bans on freedom of
expression are logically inconsistent with democratic
procedures, and not just that they are typically inimical to
them. He targets a range of positions that defend bans on
some acts of expression in the name of protecting
democratic institutions. Whilst there may be good reason
to limit acts of expression in some circumstances – for
example, for reasons of security – viewpoint-selective bans
can never ‘render society more democratic’ (49). Although
Heinze spends part of the fourth chapter setting out his
own view of democratic citizenship, the central connection that he establishes between free expression and
citizenship will resonate with many political theorists in the liberal tradition and beyond.
If the more detailed account of citizenship is not essential to the central claims made in the book, it is still an
important component of it because it informs the definition of ‘longstanding, stable and prosperous democracies’ (or
LSPDs). Heinze restricts his arguments to such states, and concedes that there may be reasons in non-
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democracies or less stable states to limit some acts of expression.
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The distinction between LSPDs and other states therefore ends up doing a lot of work in Heinze’s argument. By
limiting his argument to LSPDs, he avoids what he describes as a ‘naïvely absolutist’ stance (37). It allows him to
acknowledge that there are times when restrictions on expression might be justified, such as in Germany in the
1930s and in the case of the ‘hate radio’ that emerged in Rwanda prior to the 1994 genocide.
He also takes aim at those who would seek to apply arguments that would be valid in these contexts to cases of hate
speech in LSPDs: something he calls the ‘Weimar fallacy’ (131-32). Conversely, he argues that there are not
differences between LSPDs that ought to bear on this issue, resisting the view that the more permissive laws around
expression in the US might not be applied in Western Europe because of some difference in political culture. This is
intuitively a persuasive case: after all, it is hard to deny the differences between contemporary London and 1930s
Berlin. However, there might be some who object to exactly where Heinze draws the line of LSPDs or wonder about
marginal cases.
The argument therefore works something like this: there is a deontological case against bans as they impinge upon
democratic decision-making, but this might be overridden if the consequences of unrestricted acts of expression are
bad enough. In LSPDs, though, this is never the case. Part of what makes LSPDs stable is that they are able to
ensure security and preserve the rights of citizens, however they (ab-)use their right to freedom of expression. They
are able to stave off the potential harms that arise from an environment of unrestricted freedom of expression in a
way that other states historically have not. Heinze’s account of LSPDs is underpinned by a historicist view of
democratic practice and not just an abstract conception of democracy: he is critical of those who argue that that
LSPDs are incapable of performing this task for their failure to draw upon empirical evidence (126-28).
Likely challenges may emerge in a couple of areas. Heinze uses aggregate data about things such as racially
aggravated attacks, but this might be influenced by exogenous factors. So the argument that hate speech bans in
Europe have not prevented racially aggravated assaults, because such assaults are no less likely than in the US or
are getting more frequent, is open to a plausible counter-argument that they have prevented even more racially
aggravated assaults occurring. Theoretically, Heinze considers harm in a fairly narrow sense that is limited to the
risk of physical harm, damage to property or direct discrimination, which some readers may also take issue with.
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Crucially, the potential consequences of hate speech are not the erosion of democracy, at least in LSPDs. If they
were, bans might be justified in terms of democratic citizenship, even if it were to secure a sub-optimal democratic
state. Heinze buttresses the case that LSPDs need not succumb to such choices by arguing that there are many
steps that such states can take to foster and support democratic institutions. The state can act as a positive voice
against discrimination, for example through education, and can also ensure that the potential ill-effects of some
speech acts are offset by measures like anti-discrimination laws.
Though it is well beyond the purview of this review to argue either way, how convincing the reader finds Heinze’s
case will depend a lot on whether they find the potential risks of hate speech that he identifies exhaustive, and
whether they accept that LSPDs are able to, and do, secure democratic citizenship of a relevant kind.
Whatever verdict one reaches, this is a significant volume in the hate speech literature. It offers a powerful counter-
point to recent works advocating hate speech bans, most notably that of Jeremy Waldron. It will definitely be of
interest to anyone working in the political or legal philosophy of freedom of expression, even for those who might
disagree with Heinze in fundamental ways. Beyond the immediate academic audience, this is still an important
work. It should be accessible enough to readers who are used to academic texts, and it presents a lot of the legal
background to the issue clearly, such as the way that freedom of expression is enshrined in various constitutions
and treaties.
The book’s major strength is in presenting a defence of freedom of expression that is firmly rooted in the important,
though abstract, discussion of rights and citizenship, but at the same time gives proper credence to real-world
factors that shape legal regimes. It contributes not only an important critique of some prominent positions on
freedom of expression, but also a distinct methodological approach to the problem.
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